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22 May 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting with Under Secretary Armacost and  
Ambassador Abramowitz, 23 May 1986

1. You are scheduled to have lunch with Mr. Armacost and Ambassador Abramowitz tomorrow at 1230 in the DCI Dining Room.

2. The following items have been coordinated with the Department:

TAB A Review of Contra Situation. State will raise the Contra issue and will want an update and an exchange of views. New developments include:

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NO TAB Pak Nuclear Program. State wants to talk about how to brief the Hill on Pakistan's nuclear program. State has been very uncomfortable on this issue because of the ramifications for other foreign policy issues. State does owe a report to Congress on Pakistan's Nuclear Program. It was due in January. The last one was delivered in January 1985. We should offer to assist State in writing the new report.

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
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NO TAB Taiwan-China Talks on the 747. State would like to know how the decision to negotiate was reached and what the reaction is in Taiwan:

- Taiwan's decision to negotiate came only after a week of intense lobbying in the Taiwan legislature and growing public demand for the safe return of the crew. The ruling Kuomintang was charged with being willing to sacrifice two lives for the sake of principle.
- By allowing the talks to take place only between officials of Taiwan's China Airlines and the Civil Aeronautic Administration of China, Taipei maintained that the negotiations were "non-political" and would not compromise its policy of no contact with the mainland.
- Contacts with the mainland in a business context, i.e. non-political, had been raised at high levels of the Kuomintang by businessmen in Taipei in the past. The KMT may have to regroup in the wake of the 747 decision.
- Beijing's low key approach to the talks and decision to repatriate the aircraft and two crew members in Hong Kong scored propaganda points with the public on Taiwan. Taiwan authorities received widespread domestic praise for deciding to permit CAL to open direct discussions in Hong Kong with CAAC.

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3. You may also wish to raise the following topics:

NO TAB Leaks. You may want to discuss the results of the morning's NSPG meeting.

NO TAB Mexico. Under Secretary Armacost will have chaired a SIG meeting on Mexico earlier in the day. You may want to ask him to bring the group up to date.

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TAB B US-Zaire: Strains in Relations. State indicated they wanted to discuss recent strains in US-Zaire relations (triggered by Mobutu's decision to throw out Peace Corps personnel)

The following points summarize a memo on US-Zaire strains that you will find at Tab B.

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
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
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
NO TAB USSR/Afghanistan/Pakistan. The question of next moves in the Afghan-Pakistan Proximity Talks may come up. We remain concerned that Yakub could still be drawn further into a process which sooner or later

conditions which favor consolidation of the communist regime in Kabul -- in short, the same kind of potential problem we face with the Contadora process.

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- The Soviets are likely to broach -- possibly in the next few days -- a more reasonable sounding schedule for the withdrawal of their troops than the 4-year timetable currently being proposed by the Afghan side.
- The 18-month schedule reported to be under consideration by Moscow and Kabul may be a maximum Soviet fall back position. The Soviets will, of course, open with something much more grudging.
- Or the Soviets may not take a withdrawal time schedule very seriously at all because, if the Paks agree to stop supporting the resistance, they will almost certainly be unable to resume and the Soviets can decide later whether or not to comply.

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
If the proximity talks continue to progress, the USG will have to decide whether and how it wants to intervene to stop or deflect the process. It would probably be counterproductive for State to simply repeat its now oft-stated concerns, only to get now familiar Pak reassurances in reply. What more can be done?

- There may be some daylight between Zia and Yakub on what's going on at the Proximity Talks and in any private dialogue with the Soviets. We ought to make sure our view of the dangers of a "peace process" that undercuts the resistance are presented directly to Zia.
- The Chinese appear to share our concerns about where this is all going. We might, in the guise of an exchange about what the Soviets are up to, encourage them to use a little persuasion with Zia.
- We should try to agree more explicitly with the Paks on criteria for a suitably short Soviet withdrawal schedule worthy of any serious discussion, namely, it should be so short as to preclude any further consolidation of the Kabul regime.

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Status of the Insurgency

The Rebels

After six difficult months, the rebels are showing signs of improvement, particularly in the traditional northwest combat zone.

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The increase in activity in the northwest has been offset somewhat by the decline of the central front, which bore the brunt of the fighting between September and March.

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The Indian and southern front insurgent groups have additional forces whose prospects also have improved.

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Outlook

The outlook is for continued stalemate over the next six months.

- The insurgents probably will emphasize hit-and-run attacks in the northwest while they try to expand activities in central Nicaragua as quickly as possible.
- With their current force structure, the Sandinistas can contain the insurgency as it presently operates in the countryside, but cannot defeat it.
- The regime is likely to expand its advantage, however, if the rebels do not receive US aid.

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22 May 1986

## TALKING POINTS FOR THE DCI

US-Zaire: Strains in Relations

From Kinshasa's point of view, current tensions are the result of a number of events that have occurred over the past year.

- We believe Mobutu's longstanding fear of Communism--he openly refers to the "red belt" around Zaire--has intensified over the past year because of what he sees as growing Soviet and Cuban support to Luanda. Mobutu was disturbed by the success of the 1985 Angolan government offensive against UNITA--particularly the recapture of a large area of land bordering on Zaire--and attributed the Angolan forces' improved performance to increased Soviet materiel and advisory support. We believe Mobutu fears a UNITA defeat would leave Zaire prey to a Soviet-backed regime with a Cuban-based army.
- Mobutu has long followed a dual-track policy of providing covert support to UNITA while maintaining a dialogue with Luanda in hopes that one day he will be called upon by both sides to broker a reconciliation. Over the past year, however, Luanda's refusal to resume serious negotiations with Washington or talk directly with UNITA has frustrated Mobutu and probably convinced him that only increased military pressure on the MPLA will force it to seek a military solution.

- [REDACTED] tensions along the border have escalated.

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[REDACTED]

Although the dissidents do not pose an immediate threat to the Mobutu regime, increased rebel activity would force him to divert scarce resources and could lead to increasingly repressive security measures. These, in turn, could inspire unrest among the population, already unhappy with declining living standards.

- Rebel attacks are most likely to come from Tanzanian-based dissidents who, despite their ethnic divisions and lack of supplies, are capable of small-scale cross-border raids into Zaire. If Tanzania, in retaliation for Mobutu's support to UNITA, allows Libyan diplomats in Dar es Salaam greater freedom to support the dissidents, we believe the effectiveness of rebel activity would increase.
- Angolan-based dissidents are in a state of disarray due to lack of support from Luanda, internal leadership struggles, and harassment from UNITA forces. A decision by the Angola Government to renew support and allow the rebels to again establish bases near the border could result in raids that might threaten vital mining facilities in southwestern Zaire. [REDACTED]

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#### President Mobutu's Next Moves

Mobutu is likely to react in several ways to what he sees as his worsening security situation, growing regional isolation, and inadequate support from the US.

- We believe he will emphasize regional diplomacy in an effort to counteract censure from black Africans over Zaire's support to UNITA. [REDACTED] suggests tht his vehement public denials that Kinshasa is supporting UNITA, his recent decision to reactivate Zaire's membership in the OAU, and his apparent willingness to meet with Dos Santos and other Frontline States' leaders reflect his concern that he is becoming increasingly isolated.

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-- He also is likely to improve poor relations with the Soviet Union in hopes of appearing more non-aligned and to forestall possible Angolan retaliation. He has shown unusual interest in recent Soviet proposals to improve ties and recently appointed a Soviet-educated Foreign Minister who has good contacts in the Soviet Bloc

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-- If rebel activity increases, Mobutu almost certainly will make strong demarches for emergency US security assistance, claiming that his security problems are the direct result of his support for US policies. At the same time, he will probably work to strengthen ties with France and Belgium who he almost certainly looks to as the final guarantors of his security.

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